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Abstract 
We study factors that can influence Delayed Reward Discounting (DRD) behavior from a novel approach based 
on economic theory. Real Option (RO) analysis shows that when a decision is irreversible, can be delayed and 
produces uncertain benefits, then future rewards will be discounted in a way that produces seemingly irrational 
behavior. In a factorial experimental survey, we asked college students how much they were willing to pay for a 
digital product when the above factors are involved. Results show that DRD behavior is significantly more 
manifest when the above factors are present than when absent. We proceeded to calculate the magnitude of this 
increased DRD behavior that is consistent with predictions from RO theory. 
Keywords: delay discounting, real option, uncertainty 
1. Introduction 
Delayed Reward Discounting (DRD), also known as hyperbolic discounting, refers to a situation where the value 
of a future reward is discounted back to the present by a subject using a discount rate that diminishes over time 
(e.g., Sozou, 1998; Mazur, 1989, 2001; Ainslie, 1975, 2001, 2010; Rachlin, 2000). Almost every individual 
suffers DRD quantitatively (various discount rates), not qualitatively (yes or no). The serious DRD sufferers 
often choose short-term but often specious gains over long-term ones (e.g., Dickman, 1990). 
The severe form of DRD is often suspected in some pathological behavior or impulsivity such as substance 
dependence and addictive disorder (e.g., Bickel et al., 1999; Madden et al., 2011; Mackillop et al., 2011; for a 
thorough review). Bickel et al. (2012) observed that severe DRD has been associated with a wide spectrum of 
behavioral maladies (e.g., pathological gambling, poor health choices, overeating, etc.). It may be a trans-disease 
process that occurs across a range of disorders. This makes findings from one disorder relevant to others. 
Irrational DRD behavior has also been implicated in economic decision-making such as retirement saving 
(Thaler & Benartzi, 2004) and resource allocation over time (Hendrickx et al., 2001). Behavioral economics has 
been employed to design effective prescriptive programs to remedy the situation (Kahneman & Tversky, 2000). 
Although DRD is always present to a certain extent in an individual, DRD becomes severe enough to render a 
subject outwardly irrational. Numerous studies have identified factors that can trigger an otherwise mild form of 
DRD to become significantly problematic. In this paper, we turn to the Real Option (RO) approach in modern 
economic analysis for an alternative explanation. An RO gives the holder the right but not the obligation (i.e., it 
is a choice) to undertake a certain project. That is, the project will incur certain costs now and reap the benefits at 
future dates. If the expected present value of the future benefits exceeds the initial costs, then we go ahead with 
the project. Otherwise we refrain (e.g., Silberberg & Suen, 2001). However, when three specific conditions are 
satisfied (to be mentioned below), we will go ahead only if the expected present value of the future benefits 
exceeds the initial costs plus the value of an RO (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994): (1) when the future benefits are 
uncertain, (2) the initial cost outlays are irreversible (cannot be recouped once expended) and (3) the project can 
be delayed (it is not now or never). Then the project manager has the option to put the project on hold when the 
project’s earning visibility is too low and the option to go ahead vice versa. The option to be able to do this has 
an intrinsic value. 
The effect of this RO is to make the manager more reluctant to undertake the project now (i.e., procrastinate). He 
wants to hold out for higher compensation for the loss of this option (Dixit, 1992). Much as the DRD subject 
would insist on a higher-valued present alternative before he would give up a gamble or substance dependence. 
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In the next section, I describe how the RO can be linked to DRD. Section three is an experimental survey that 
attempts to elicit the RO and the corresponding magnitude of DRD in a consumer behavior setting. Section four 
summarizes the survey results and section five conducts statistical analysis. Section six concludes and points to 
some future research directions.  
2. The Real Option Approach 
On a certain level, severe DRD is perhaps synonymous with the reluctance to adopt changes in certain chronic 
pathological behavior such as gambling, alcohol abuse or procrastination. The idea stems from the traditional 
benefit-cost analysis. The subject carries through an action when the perceived benefits of the action are greater 
than its costs. In the 1990s, two economists, A. Dixit and R. Pindyck discovered the RO. When the three 
above-mentioned pre-conditions are present, the benefits must outweigh the costs by a wide margin to 
accommodate the value of an RO. The ability to delay an irreversible action when the future benefits are 
uncertain has a significant value. Furthermore, this option vanishes once it is exercised. Therefore, subjects 
demand a compensation (Dixit et al., 1999). 
Analogously, suppose a consumer is confronted with potentially uncertain benefits from a product offering. He is 
more reluctant to carry out the purchase now if it is irreversible but can be delayed. He is waiting for a more 
opportune time when the benefits exceed the costs by the value of a purchase option, before he is willing to let 
go of/exercise it (e.g., Harrison, 1985; Harrison & Kreps, 1979). The value of this option now succinctly 
captures the magnitude of the consumer’s DRD. For the consumer to purchase now, he would demand a 
compensation for the loss of the purchase option. This compensation may be in the form of a discount on his 
willingness to pay (WTP) for the purchase, i.e., a lowered WTP. How much lower depends on how steep a 
discount he attaches to the product’s price. Hence, the decrease in his WTP is exactly the magnitude of his DRD. 
Now suppose that even if the consumer pays full RRP (recommended retail price), the product’s benefits are still 
worth it. However, he will not purchase at RRP now. He wants to delay it because the purchase price may get 
lower (on account of a future promotional deal). In other words, he procrastinates (Tversky & Shafir, 1992; 
Herrmann et al., 2009). He is delaying his purchase because he is discounting the delayed reward (net benefits) 
of the purchase. That is why he will not buy now even though net benefits are positive. Therefore, DRD seems 
irrational but not if the reason he delays is because he holds the buy option, and the buy option has value. In that 
case, the net benefits of the purchase may not be sufficient enough to overcome the option value. The discount in 
DRD (manifested as a lowered WTP) is to account for the existence of the value of this option. Therefore DRD 
is due to this option, and the option exists in the presence of uncertainty, irreversibility and delay. Ergo, these are 
the three factors affecting DRD in this scenario. The survey below will show precisely that this trio of factors 
must be present simultaneously for the RO to exist, i.e., for DRD to manifest itself. 
3. The Survey 
3.1 Participants 
To investigate the suppressing effect of an RO on WTP, I carried out a survey at a university in Turkey during 
the week of May 3 to May 7, 2010. It was a non-exam week. The location was the Faculty of Business and 
Economics (FBE). Seven interviewers (senior students) were recruited (labeled a, b, c, d, e, f, g). Interviewers a, 
c, d, g were male, while c, e, f were female. There were two survey venues: the small cafeteria inside the FBE 
building and the large Café inside the Central Lectures Hall (CLH). There were a total of five class days. On 
each day, one interviewer is placed each at FBE and CLH from 0800 to 0830 (morning coffee break before 
classes start) and from 1200 to 1230 (during lunch break). Therefore, there were a total of 20 survey sessions 
(two sessions per day x two venues x five days). The assignment of interviewers at each location and time slot 
was random. An interviewer might conduct more than one survey session since there are more sessions (20) than 
interviewers (seven). The allocation of interviewers can be seen in Table 1—the survey dataset. 
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Table 1. Survey dataset 
WTP scenario 16 or 32Gb sex day Time Venue interviewer 
850 2 16 m 1 0800-0830 CLH a 
1050 3 32 f 1 0800-0830 CLH a 
900 4 32 f 1 0800-0830 CLH a 
890 8 16 m 1 0800-0830 CLH a 
1000 1 32 f 1 0800-0830 CLH a 
800 4 32 f 1 0800-0830 CLH a 
900 5 16 f 1 0800-0830 CLH a 
850 6 16 m 1 0800-0830 CLH a 
1000 2 32 m 1 0800-0830 CLH a 
1040 3 32 f 1 0800-0830 CLH a 
1050 2 32 f 1 0800-0830 FBE b 
900 3 16 f 1 0800-0830 FBE b 
750 4 16 f 1 0800-0830 FBE b 
1100 2 32 m 1 0800-0830 FBE b 
960 3 16 f 1 0800-0830 FBE b 
700 4 16 m 1 0800-0830 FBE b 
850 5 16 f 1 0800-0830 FBE b 
1050 6 32 f 1 0800-0830 FBE b 
900 7 16 f 1 0800-0830 FBE b 
1050 8 32 m 1 0800-0830 FBE b 
900 2 16 f 1 0800-0830 FBE b 
880 8 16 m 1 1200-1230 CLH a 
1100 5 32 m 1 1200-1230 CLH a 
1010 6 32 m 1 1200-1230 CLH a 
700 4 16 f 1 1200-1230 CLH a 
900 3 16 m 1 1200-1230 CLH a 
800 4 16 f 1 1200-1230 CLH a 
1050 5 32 f 1 1200-1230 CLH a 
1000 6 32 f 1 1200-1230 CLH a 
1100 7 32 m 1 1200-1230 CLH a 
800 2 16 m 1 1200-1230 CLH a 
1100 2 32 m 1 1200-1230 FBE c 
1100 3 32 m 1 1200-1230 FBE c 
850 4 16 f 1 1200-1230 FBE c 
850 1 16 f 1 1200-1230 FBE c 
890 6 16 f 1 1200-1230 FBE c 
1000 8 32 m 1 1200-1230 FBE c 
1050 7 32 f 1 1200-1230 FBE c 
900 5 16 m 1 1200-1230 FBE c 
600 4 16 m 1 1200-1230 FBE c 
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910 3 16 f 1 1200-1230 FBE c 
890 3 16 f 2 0800-0830 CLH d 
600 4 16 f 2 0800-0830 CLH d 
890 5 16 m 2 0800-0830 CLH d 
1000 2 32 m 2 0800-0830 CLH d 
1100 6 32 m 2 0800-0830 CLH d 
950 8 32 m 2 0800-0830 CLH d 
900 7 16 f 2 0800-0830 CLH d 
800 1 16 m 2 0800-0830 CLH d 
1000 2 32 f 2 0800-0830 CLH d 
700 4 16 f 2 0800-0830 FBE e 
1100 5 32 f 2 0800-0830 FBE e 
850 6 16 m 2 0800-0830 FBE e 
950 2 32 m 2 0800-0830 FBE e 
900 3 16 m 2 0800-0830 FBE e 
800 4 16 f 2 0800-0830 FBE e 
1100 1 32 m 2 0800-0830 FBE e 
990 8 32 f 2 0800-0830 FBE e 
900 1 16 f 2 0800-0830 FBE e 
1100 3 32 m 2 0800-0830 FBE e 
900 4 32 f 2 1200-1230 CLH f 
850 4 32 m 2 1200-1230 CLH f 
1040 5 32 f 2 1200-1230 CLH f 
890 6 16 m 2 1200-1230 CLH f 
1000 2 32 f 2 1200-1230 CLH f 
950 1 16 m 2 1200-1230 CLH f 
800 2 16 m 2 1200-1230 CLH f 
850 8 16 m 2 1200-1230 CLH f 
1100 7 32 f 2 1200-1230 CLH f 
900 8 16 f 2 1200-1230 CLH f 
650 4 16 f 2 1200-1230 FBE g 
750 4 16 f 2 1200-1230 FBE g 
1080 5 32 m 2 1200-1230 FBE g 
1070 6 32 f 2 1200-1230 FBE g 
900 2 16 f 2 1200-1230 FBE g 
920 3 16 m 2 1200-1230 FBE g 
900 1 16 f 2 1200-1230 FBE g 
900 8 16 m 2 1200-1230 FBE g 
1050 7 32 f 2 1200-1230 FBE g 
950 2 32 m 2 1200-1230 FBE g 
1000 1 32 m 2 1200-1230 FBE g 
850 2 16 m 3 0800-0830 CLH g 
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880 2 16 m 3 0800-0830 CLH g 
780 4 16 f 3 0800-0830 CLH g 
890 1 16 m 3 0800-0830 CLH g 
990 6 32 f 3 0800-0830 CLH g 
1000 7 32 f 3 0800-0830 CLH g 
690 4 16 m 3 0800-0830 CLH g 
890 5 16 f 3 0800-0830 CLH g 
1050 8 32 f 3 0800-0830 CLH g 
1050 5 32 f 3 0800-0830 CLH g 
900 2 16 m 3 0800-0830 FBE c 
720 4 16 f 3 0800-0830 FBE c 
1050 3 32 m 3 0800-0830 FBE c 
1030 5 32 f 3 0800-0830 FBE c 
880 6 16 m 3 0800-0830 FBE c 
900 7 16 f 3 0800-0830 FBE c 
950 8 32 m 3 0800-0830 FBE c 
900 1 16 f 3 0800-0830 FBE c 
870 2 16 f 3 0800-0830 FBE c 
1100 3 32 f 3 0800-0830 FBE c 
900 5 16 m 3 0800-0830 FBE c 
1000 3 32 m 3 0800-0830 FBE c 
900 3 16 f 3 1200-1230 CLH d 
750 4 16 m 3 1200-1230 CLH d 
880 3 16 f 3 1200-1230 CLH d 
1100 2 32 f 3 1200-1230 CLH d 
1050 1 32 m 3 1200-1230 CLH d 
1060 5 32 f 3 1200-1230 CLH d 
810 4 16 m 3 1200-1230 CLH d 
1100 7 32 f 3 1200-1230 CLH d 
1030 8 32 f 3 1200-1230 CLH d 
900 4 32 m 3 1200-1230 CLH d 
900 1 16 f 3 1200-1230 FBE b 
900 2 16 m 3 1200-1230 FBE b 
800 4 16 f 3 1200-1230 FBE b 
900 5 16 m 3 1200-1230 FBE b 
865 6 16 f 3 1200-1230 FBE b 
1050 7 32 m 3 1200-1230 FBE b 
1100 8 32 m 3 1200-1230 FBE b 
865 5 16 m 3 1200-1230 FBE b 
1100 1 32 f 3 1200-1230 FBE b 
1100 2 32 f 3 1200-1230 FBE b 
850 2 16 f 4 0800-0830 CLH f 
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900 3 16 f 4 0800-0830 CLH f 
900 2 16 f 4 0800-0830 CLH f 
1000 4 32 m 4 0800-0830 CLH f 
800 4 16 m 4 0800-0830 CLH f 
1055 5 32 f 4 0800-0830 CLH f 
900 6 16 f 4 0800-0830 CLH f 
1050 1 32 m 4 0800-0830 CLH f 
1060 7 32 m 4 0800-0830 CLH f 
910 8 16 m 4 0800-0830 CLH f 
800 2 16 f 4 0800-0830 FBE c 
900 1 16 m 4 0800-0830 FBE c 
1000 2 32 f 4 0800-0830 FBE c 
950 4 32 m 4 0800-0830 FBE c 
910 6 16 f 4 0800-0830 FBE c 
910 7 16 f 4 0800-0830 FBE c 
1050 8 32 m 4 0800-0830 FBE c 
1100 6 32 m 4 0800-0830 FBE c 
1020 7 32 m 4 0800-0830 FBE c 
900 8 16 f 4 0800-0830 FBE c 
900 4 32 f 4 0800-0830 FBE c 
1100 3 32 f 4 1200-1230 CLH b 
920 5 16 m 4 1200-1230 CLH b 
1100 1 32 m 4 1200-1230 CLH b 
900 6 16 m 4 1200-1230 CLH b 
910 7 16 f 4 1200-1230 CLH b 
890 8 16 m 4 1200-1230 CLH b 
1100 8 32 f 4 1200-1230 CLH b 
920 1 16 f 4 1200-1230 CLH b 
700 4 16 f 4 1200-1230 CLH b 
1010 5 32 m 4 1200-1230 CLH b 
900 3 16 f 4 1200-1230 FBE a 
800 2 16 m 4 1200-1230 FBE a 
890 3 16 f 4 1200-1230 FBE a 
1040 5 32 f 4 1200-1230 FBE a 
1050 6 32 m 4 1200-1230 FBE a 
900 7 16 m 4 1200-1230 FBE a 
900 4 32 f 4 1200-1230 FBE a 
1000 5 32 f 4 1200-1230 FBE a 
900 1 16 f 4 1200-1230 FBE a 
1060 7 32 m 4 1200-1230 FBE a 
910 8 16 f 4 1200-1230 FBE a 
950 3 16 f 5 0800-0830 CLH d 
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800 4 16 m 5 0800-0830 CLH d 
900 2 32 m 5 0800-0830 CLH d 
1100 3 32 m 5 0800-0830 CLH d 
900 1 16 f 5 0800-0830 CLH d 
1100 6 32 f 5 0800-0830 CLH d 
900 7 16 f 5 0800-0830 CLH d 
900 8 16 f 5 0800-0830 CLH d 
700 4 16 m 5 0800-0830 CLH d 
1070 5 32 m 5 0800-0830 CLH d 
900 3 16 f 5 0800-0830 FBE g 
950 4 32 m 5 0800-0830 FBE g 
900 5 16 f 5 0800-0830 FBE g 
660 4 16 m 5 0800-0830 FBE g 
910 6 16 f 5 0800-0830 FBE g 
1050 7 32 f 5 0800-0830 FBE g 
1100 8 32 f 5 0800-0830 FBE g 
900 7 16 m 5 0800-0830 FBE g 
1050 5 32 f 5 0800-0830 FBE g 
905 1 16 m 5 0800-0830 FBE g 
950 2 32 m 5 0800-0830 FBE g 
900 2 16 f 5 1200-1230 CLH f 
1100 3 32 m 5 1200-1230 CLH f 
1000 4 32 f 5 1200-1230 CLH f 
900 3 16 m 5 1200-1230 CLH f 
800 4 32 m 5 1200-1230 CLH f 
910 1 16 m 5 1200-1230 CLH f 
900 6 16 f 5 1200-1230 CLH f 
1080 7 32 f 5 1200-1230 CLH f 
1020 8 32 f 5 1200-1230 CLH f 
1060 5 32 m 5 1200-1230 CLH f 
700 4 16 f 5 1200-1230 FBE e 
900 5 16 m 5 1200-1230 FBE e 
900 7 16 f 5 1200-1230 FBE e 
1100 7 32 m 5 1200-1230 FBE e 
760 4 32 f 5 1200-1230 FBE e 
890 2 16 m 5 1200-1230 FBE e 
1100 1 32 m 5 1200-1230 FBE e 
990 2 32 f 5 1200-1230 FBE e 
910 3 16 f 5 1200-1230 FBE e 
1050 2 32 m 5 1200-1230 FBE e 
1050 8 32 f 5 1200-1230 FBE e 
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3.2 Materials and Procedure 
In each session, around ten subjects (students going to classes) were randomly approached by the interviewer. 
The interviewer first read the standardized script to the student (written on a piece of paper). Then the 
interviewer asked the subject to choose one envelope from a total of eight envelopes. Each envelope contained a 
different scenario and the subject’s WTP was then solicited. All material was translated to Turkish on the spot by 
the interviewers. If the subject was an international student, the original English wording is used. 
The following standardized script was described to every subject: 
Very shortly, a new iPhone 4 without any mobile carrier contract (i.e., no SIM card) will go on sale for the 
Recommended Retail Prices (RRPs) of $599 (16Gb) and $699 (32Gb) in the US. How much would you be 
willing to pay in Turkish Lira (TL)? Before you consider the answer, there is a phone shop in town. They are 
planning to do a promotion in the near future. You pick up a queuing number and wait for customer service (like 
in a bank). Depending on your number, you may get a discount of 10%, 20% or no discount on a new iPhone 4. 
The discount allocation is random and at the manager’s discretion. There is no mention when the promotional 
offer will start or finish. Therefore, if you don’t want to miss out on a new iPhone 4 while stocks last, you should 
not wait for the promotion to start. Furthermore, there is no purchase obligation if you don’t hit the promotion 
jackpot. The promotion outcome is revealed to you before you make the purchase commitment. If you renege or 
walk away from your purchase, you can come back and try your luck again on another day (but not today). 
However, there is no guarantee stocks still last. 
The survey is a 2x2x2 factorial design with the three binary factors (Stocks, Refund and Promotion) listed in 
Table 2. 
 
Table 2. Description of survey scenarios 
Scenario Stocks Refund Promotion
1 1 0 0 
2 1 0 1 
3 1 1 0 
4 1 1 1 
5 0 0 0 
6 0 0 1 
7 0 1 0 
8 0 1 1 
Stocks: 0 = limited, 1 = unlimited; Refund: 0 = possible, 1 = impossible; Promotion: 0 = no, 1 = yes. 
 
The binary choices for “Stocks” are 0 (limited) or 1 (aplenty), for “Refund” are 0 (available) or 1 (not possible), 
and for “Promotion” are 0 (no future discounts) or 1 (future discounts possible). Various combinations of the 
three binary factors can lead to a total of eight possible different scenarios (2x2x2 = 8). The following were these 
eight scenarios that the subjects could randomly chose: 
1): stocks are aplenty(1), refund is possible(0) but there is no promotion(0). 
Rationale: there is no possibility to pay any less, and there is nothing to gain by waiting. Hence, buy at RRP now 
and enjoy. 
2): stocks are aplenty(1), refund is possible(0) and there is promotion(1). 
Rationale: there is possibility to pay less. But even if you pay full RRP, you can demand a refund and try again 
later to see if you can hit the promotion jackpot. Therefore, to buy now doesn’t constitute a commitment because 
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you can always refund it. Hence, you should be happy to pay RRP now and enjoy. Note that there is a weak 
option here if there are transactions costs, such as travel to and from the premise. 
3): stocks are aplenty(1), refund is impossible(1) but there is no promotion(0). 
Rationale: there is no possibility to pay any less. There is nothing to gain by waiting. Hence, buy at RRP now 
and enjoy.  
4): stocks are aplenty(1), refund is impossible(1) and there is promotion(1). 
Rationale: there is possibility to pay less. Even if you don’t hit the promotion jack port, you have the right to 
refuse purchase. However, to buy now constitutes a commitment since you cannot refund it. Therefore you will 
demand a premium for a loss of this option to buy cheap later. That means you are willing to pay less for the 
iPhone now. Alternatively, you are happy to wait for a promotion hit and enjoy later. The option is here. But it 
exists only when stocks are unlimited and you cannot take it back for a refund. It pays to wait for a promotion 
jackpot. The cost of delaying the reward (of enjoying the product), or DRD, is the discounting or lowering of the 
WTP. 
5): stocks are limited(0), refund is possible(0) but there is no promotion(0). 
Rationale: there is no possibility to pay any less. Since you may miss out on your favorite toy, it is better to buy 
at RRP now and enjoy. 
6): stocks are limited(0), refund is possible(0) and there is promotion(1). 
Rationale: there is possibility to pay less. If you don’t hit the promotion jackpot, you can still buy now. You can 
make up any excuse for a refund and try again later. But you may miss out on your favorite toy because there 
may be no stock. To avoid the possibility of missing out, it is better to pay full RRP now and enjoy. 
7): stocks are limited(0), refund is impossible(1) but there is no promotion(0). 
Rationale: there is no possibility to pay any less. You may miss out on your favorite toy. Hence, buy at full RRP 
now and enjoy. 
8): stocks are limited(0), refund is impossible(1) and there is promotion(1). 
Rationale: there is possibility to pay less. However, if you don’t hit the promotion jackpot, you cannot make up 
any excuse for a refund and try again later. Besides, you may miss out on your favorite toy. There may be no 
stock. To avoid the possibility of missing out, it is better to pay full RRP now and enjoy. 
Notice that the subject only had to consider one of these eight scenarios based on the envelope they randomly 
chose. They would not see or consider the other seven scenarios. The rationales behind all scenarios were not 
explained to the subjects lest there be unwanted influences on the discounted WTP (DRD). Interviewers were 
told to read from the script verbatim without any improvisation. They were not allowed to make price 
recommendations. The exchange rate was approximately 1 USD = 1.5 TL in May 2010. They were told to 
specifically discard uncooperative subjects who joked, offered ridiculous prices (too high, too low), who didn’t 
understand or misunderstood the question, compared with android/blackberry phones, or couldn’t afford to pay. 
Interviewers were not allowed to simply reject a subject based on their own judgement. Interviewers did not 
reveal other subjects’ WTPs during the survey but they did aid in the subjects’ calculation, e.g., exchange rate 
from $ to TL or vice versa. 
The interviewers’ discretion did not create experimenter bias. Only six discards were reported out of 213 
interviews (i.e., 207 usable observations). 
The eight experimental scenarios may seem too complex and confusing. This was anticipated. Our strategy was 
to give a preamble first before each interview so that each subject was appropriately “placed”. Then the subject 
was required to choose only ONE scenario from eight possibilities. They did not have to consider the other 
scenarios. This strategy had worked out well. Subjects did not report any complexity or confusion during the 
interviews. 
Subjects were not interviewed in a quiet and controlled setting. We intentionally chose the busy cafeteria for this 
survey. Subjects were required to give an intuitive WTP without too much consideration. We believed that WTP 
was especially prone to mental manipulation when subjects “over-think”. 
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4. Survey Results 
Our empirical strategy is to eliminate all possible potential confounding factors, i.e., subject’s gender, survey 
day/time/venue, and interviewer bias (Tables 3 and 4). Then we conduct a 2x2x2 factorial ANOVA to determine 
if the three factors (stocks, refund and promotion) and their combinations are producing significant effects 
(Tables 5 and 6) on the discounted WTPs. Finally, we isolate one specific combination (the RO) and calculate 
how much delayed discounting on WTP that this specific combination of factors can produce (Table 7). 
Table 3 for the 16G model shows that all confounding variables, including subject gender, survey 
day/time/venue and interviewer, do not exhibit statistically significant differences (p > .05). For example, WTPs 
from female and male subjects appear to be drawn from the same probability distribution with identical means 
(860.08 TL vs 852.50 TL) and Standard Deviations (SD). Ditto for survey day/time/venue and interviewer.  
 
Table 3. ANOVA of survey findings for a 16 Gbyte memory iPhone 4 
1. Sex of subject female male      F-statistic p-value 
Average WTP 860.08 852.50      0.26 0.61 
2. Survey day 1 2 3 4 5     
Average WTP 842.27 840.00 853.04 879.13 868.33   1.07 0.37 
3. Survey time 0800-0830 1200-1230        
Average WTP 855.00 858.68      0.06 0.80 
4. Survey venue CLH FBE        
Average WTP 855.29 858.05      0.04 0.85 
5. Interviewer a b c d e f g   
Average WTP 858.00 864.74 860.56 838.00 845.00 884.00 843.06 0.63 0.71 
 
For the 32G case (Table 4), WTPs solicited on different survey days also are not statistically different with 
almost identical means (1028.95 TL for day 1 vs 1017.37 TL for day 2 vs 1042.63 TL for day 3 vs 1028.68 TL 
for day 4 vs 1018.10 TL for day 5). Similarly for survey time/venue, sex of subject and interviewer (p > .05).  
 
Table 4. ANOVA of survey findings for a 32 Gbyte memory iPhone 4 
1. Sex of subject female Male      F-statistic p-value
Average WTP 1025.41 1028.54      0.04 0.84 
2. Survey day 1 2 3 4 5     
Average WTP 1028.95 1017.37 1042.63 1028.68 1018.10   0.37 0.83 
3. Survey time 0800-0830 1200-1230        
Average WTP 1021.38 1032.20      0.52 0.47 
4. Survey venue CLH FBE        
Average WTP 1021.35 1032.45      0.55 0.46 
5. Interviewer a b c d e f g   
Average WTP 1006.25 1075.83 1026.67 1032.86 1026.36 1007.67 1024.29 1.30 0.26 
 
Tables 5 and 6 give the factorial analysis of the survey. They showed that all three RO factors (stocks, refund 
and promotion) and their interactions are statistically significant. Not only does each factor significantly affect 
the subject’s discounting on WTP, their interactions are also highly significant. For instance, while limited 
stocks and unlimited stocks have significantly different WTP discounting, this discount difference depends 
significantly on, say, whether refund is available or not. The next step is to deduce from the experimental results 
which combination of the three factors results in the most significant WTP discount (by regression analysis). 
Since this is a 2x2x2 factorial experiment, we have a total of eight possible combinations. The RO theory says 
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that when the three factors are all in the positive (i.e., stocks are unlimited, refund is impossible and promotion is 
available), there exists an RO that leads to heavy discounting of delayed reward (i.e., future enjoyment of the 
new iPhone) in the form of discounted WTP. 
 
Table 5. Dependent variable: WTP (16 Gbyte)  
Source DF Type III SS F Value Pr > F
Stocks 1 50710.95 32.31 <.0001
Refund 1 16354.28 10.42 0.0017
Stocks*Refund 1 29147.14 18.57 <.0001
Promotion 1 79541.96 50.69 <.0001
Stocks*Promotion 1 58974.80 37.58 <.0001
Refund*Promotion 1 33727.67 21.49 <.0001
Stocks*Refund*Promotion 1 31139.60 19.84 <.0001
Error 102 160067.97   
Corrected Total 109 640229.32   
 
Table 6. Dependent variable: WTP (32 Gbyte)  
Source DF Type III SS F Value Pr > F
Stocks 1 35669.71 14.33 0.0003
Refund 1 20250.02 8.14 0.0054
Stocks*Refund 1 14983.61 6.02 0.0161
Promotion 1 95951.72 38.55 <.0001
Stocks*Promotion 1 56559.87 22.73 <.0001
Refund*Promotion 1 37646.68 15.13 0.0002
Stocks*Refund*Promotion 1 15830.42 6.36 0.0134
Error 89 221497.09   
Corrected Total 96 522527.84   
 
5. Regression Analysis 
In Table 7, the Qi’s are the seven dummy variables for scenarios two to eight. Scenario one is the intercept. 
Regression is estimated twice-once each for the 16G and 32 G iPhones. Since the WTP residuals may have 
unequal variances conditional on the eight scenarios, we employ a heteroscedastic-consistent estimation 
procedure for the standard errors (White, 1980). The βi’s calculate the effect of each scenario on WTP as 
compared to scenario one. We have estimated two regressions for both iPhone models. Regression 1 contains 
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dummies for all scenarios. In regression 2, Qi only contains the dummy for scenario four (where the RO is) while 
all the other scenarios are grouped into the intercept. This allows us to calculate the DRD (effect of the RO on 
WTP) as compared to the average of all other non-DRD scenarios (no RO). Therefore, β4 in regression 2 is the 
estimated value of the purchase option or the estimated magnitude/strength of DRD. 
 
Table 7. Regression analysis dependent variable = WTP 
 Regession 1    Regression 2    
 16 Gbyte  32 Gbyte  16 Gbyte  32 Gbyte  
regressor coeff st err^ coeff st err^ coeff st err^ coeff st err^ 
intercept 894.64** 8.81 1062.50** 14.66 890.06** 3.21 1047.68** 5.15 
Q 2 -32.77* 13.36 -47.50* 21.10     
Q 3 12.23 10.16 11.50 18.25     
Q 4 -163.77** 16.40 -169.42** 24.66 -159.19** 14.20 -154.60** 20.49 
Q 5 -2.37 10.39 -9.50 16.25     
Q 6 -8.73 10.85 -10.28 20.17     
Q 7 7.58 8.92 0.58 16.96     
Q 8 -1.64 10.28 -28.65 20.03     
R-square 0.75  0.58  0.72  0.52  
F-statistic 43.71  17.28  277.73  100.86  
p-value 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  
observations 110  97  110  97  
* - statistically significant at 5% level; ** - at 1% level 
^ - heteroscedastic-consistent standard errors (White, 1980) 
coeff - coefficient; st err - standard error; Q - scenario 
Intercept = Q 1 
Regression 1 = all scenarios represented in regression 
Regression 2 = only Q 4 is regressed, all other scenarios are represented by intercept 
Coefficient for Q 4 in regression 2 = estimated discount in WTP with RO (magnitude of DRD) 
Intercept for regression 2 = estimated WTP without RO 
 
The R2 is relatively high for a cross-sectional study. Regression 1 tells us that scenario four gives an expected 
significant difference (negative) in effect on WTP as compared to scenario one. The surprise is that scenario two 
also shows up as having a significantly different effect than scenario one, at the 5% level. This is the case for 
both 16G and 32G iPhones.  
Scenario two is the closest to having an RO (apparent DRD). In theory, it shouldn’t. The scenario allows the 
consumer to delay purchase (unlimited stock) and offers uncertain price (through the promotional discount) but 
the purchase is refundable (reversible). There is no valuable option here. Even if the consumer does not hit the 
promotion jackpot, he can always demand a refund and try again later to see if he qualifies for the discount. 
Moreover, he can do this ad infinitum. Therefore, he is happy to pay the full RRP now. He can start enjoying the 
iPhone right away, knowing full well that the discount will be there for the taking. However, some subjects 
believed the certainty of discount could be translated to a lower WTP for the phone now. This resulted in a 
decrease of approx. 33 TL for the 16 Gb model and 48 TL for the 32 Gb model.  
Scenario four is where the RO (actual DRD) exists. Here the purchase can be delayed and there is a possibility of 
discount, but the purchase is non-refundable. Therefore the subjects were not willing to pay the full RRP for the 
phone now. They knew they could never try again later to qualify for the promotional discount. To buy now 
meant to kill the option to buy cheaper later. As a result, subjects demanded a compensation for the loss of this 
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option. This resulted in a decrease in WTP (DRD) of approx. 164 TL for the 16 Gb phone and 169 TL for the 32 
Gb phone, when compared to scenario one subjects (Regression 1, Table 7). Looking at Regression 2 (Table 7), 
scenario four subjects (with the RO) demanded a drop in WTP (value of the RO or DRD) of approximately 159 
TL for the 16 Gb phone and 155 TL for the 32 Gb phone, when compared to all other subjects. On average, all 
subjects (sans scenario four) are willing to pay 890 TL for the 16 G phone and 1048 TL for the 32 G phone. On 
the contrary, scenario four subjects (holders of the RO and DRD) are only willing to pay 731 TL (890 TL-159 
TL) and 893 TL (1048 TL-155 TL), respectively. 
Interestingly, the value of the option (magnitude of the DRD) equates to approximately halfway between the 
savings for a 10% discount and a 20% discount (the two promotional offers). This is the case for both the 16 G 
and 32 G iPhones. In other words, subjects are shrewd enough to demand a reduction of at least 10% for the loss 
of future discount possibility, while also realistic enough not to demand the maximum discount possibility (20%). 
It may be a while (may be never) before he sees the 20% discount offer. In the meantime, he cannot enjoy the 
iPhone while he waits. 
6. Conclusions and Research Implications 
In this study, we introduce the Real Option (RO) theory as a competing hypothesis towards an explanation of 
DRD. Instead of soliciting the actual behavioral manifestation of the sliding scale of DRD in an experimental 
setting, we conducted a small-scaled survey among college students. We wanted to see if severe DRD can be 
observed as an intuitive verbal response without the students being aware of the survey’s actual intended 
purpose.  
The survey results suggest that when certain pre-conditions (uncertainty, irreversibility and delay) prescribed by 
RO theory are satisfied, the subjects intuitively give a response that is consistent with the severe form of DRD as 
well as with predictions from RO theory. Specifically, the non-option scenarios (one to eight except four) 
resulted in WTPs that approximated the RRP. The option scenario (four) led to discounted WTPs roughly in the 
order of the promotional discount, as the theory predicted. Hence, the survey results supported our assertion that 
the three factors of uncertainty, irreversibility and delay must be present simultaneously to create a significant 
DRD (in the form of discounted WTP). 
Therefore, this makes the RO theory a potential candidate to explain severe DRD. In the process, it also 
establishes the three required pre-conditions in RO as factors affecting DRD. 
In various presentations of our results, we have encountered the following constructive comments which have 
helped us refine the paper in its current format:  
1) Speculative explanation—The explanation of delay discounting by real option is an entirely novel concept, 
and as such is necessarily speculative. We agree that speculating about what the subjects were thinking during 
the interviews was fallacious, especially since we did not ask follow-up questions to get at this. Hence, we 
follow a positive approach in which we matched the observations with predictions from the RO theory, to see if 
they fit. 
2) Our experiment is very complicated—We have greatly simplified the experiment to meet the specifications of 
the RO theory. To avoid potential confusion to subjects, we ordered the interviewers to stick to the script 
verbatim and ask subjects to consider only ONE scenario (out of a total of eight). 
3) The interviewers’ instructions appear too confusing—The purchase delay was never specified (i.e., short or 
long delay) in order to introduce an element of uncertainty. Subjects were asked to consider a 16 G or 32 G 
iPhone from the outset. No confusion was reported. The discount is random (i.e., 0%, 10% or 20%). This is the 
uncertainty, a pre-condition for the theory to hold. Subjects could also refuse purchase. This is to introduce an 
element of reversibility, again required by theory. 
4) Interviewers were untrained volunteers—The interviewers were trained to follow a standardized script. The 
interviewers were in fact the subjects’ fellow students to minimize potential apprehension, which might heavily 
influence a financial decision (WTP). They were ordered to keep interactions to a minimum. The discarding of 
extreme data was not a problem. Only six cases were reported out of 213 interviews. 
5) More variables were not held constant—For example, “purchase delay” cannot be fixed in advance (as 
required by theory). We offered two phone types because they were the actual product offerings from Apple, Inc. 
at the time. We wished to see if another category of essentially the same product might affect the results. 
6) Parametric analysis within given subjects were not undertaken—Delay discounting is a universal phenomenon 
that is a matter of degree (whether one discounts a little or a lot), and not a matter of dichotomy (whether one 
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discounts or not). For example, we could have offered a continuous discount from 0% to 20%, and measured the 
corresponding decrease in WTP. The only choices of 0%, 10% or 20% were less desirable. This could be 
accommodated in future experiments. For now, we believe these choices would suffice to bring out the 
measurable decrease in WTP. For the 2x2x2 design, the analysis cannot be parametric since the three factors are 
dichotomous. 
7) Decision making is typically a parametric process—For example, there should be an Instrumental Variable 
(IV) that continuously affects how much a subject would discount. However, in this case, the real option is either 
present or not. It appears only if the three pre-conditions of delay, uncertainty and irreversibility are present. 
Perhaps the size of the option matters. For example, higher uncertainty results in a larger option. A proper 
parametric analysis of this kind would need further enhancements of the present experiment. As a first step, we 
show that the real option matters. How much it matters is a subject for further research. 
8) Improper conceptualization of delay discounting—Delayed reward discounting is a general phenomenon. 
Susceptibility to this behavior is a matter of degree and not a matter of whether one discounts or not. A proper 
study of delay discounting should follow a parametric analysis of IVs on a subject’s discount response. In our 
experiment we were dealing with a dichotomous factor that is either present or not (real option). Perhaps the 
strength of this factor (when it is present) would indicate whether an individual would be at risk of behavioral 
maladies. It is an important research direction. Here we have shown that this factor matters. How much it matters 
awaits further research. 
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Note 
Note 1. Although the 3rd person singular pronoun he/his was used throughout to describe the subject/consumer, 
he was intended to be gender-neutral. 
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